Abstract-In this letter, we investigate the problem of spectrum access decision-making for the secondary users (SUs) in the cognitive radio networks. When the primary users (PUs) are absent on certain frequency bandwidth, SUs can formulate a queue and wait for the base station (BS) to serve. The queue of the SUs will be dismissed if the PU is emerging in the system. Leveraging the queueing game approaches, the decision-making process of the SUs that whether to queue or not is studied. Both individual equilibrium and social optimization strategies are derived analytically. Moreover, the optimal pricing strategy of the service provider is investigated as well. Our proposed algorithms and corresponding analysis are validated through simulation studies.
I. INTRODUCTION

I
N THE development of cognitive radio networks (CRNs), how to explore the access opportunities for the unlicensed secondary users (SUs) and regulate the spectrum access without harming the licensed primary users (PUs) are of consistent research interests [1] . Recently, there is a particular interest to apply the game theory [2] which is commonly used in developing optimization algorithms to address the spectrum access problems [1] . Intriguingly, applying queue theory with pricing strategies also brings a novel view on understanding the SU's behavior and cognitive market policies, which can be traced from the original works of [3] - [5] that study the equilibrium behavior in queueing systems. We call it the queueing game in the following to highlight the key issues in this area: by utilizing the information of queue and considering its own profit, the user needs to make the decision on whether to queue or not. Recent works of [6] - [8] have leveraged the queueing game to the spectrum access control in the CRN. In [6] , the authors present an observed queue model with SUs acquiring for transmission from a cognitive base station (CBS). It is also assumed that PUs emerge periodically for transmission opportunities. During the PU's transmission period, CBS stops serving SUs and SUs remain in the queue waiting for the re-operation of CBS. Accordingly, a SU's decision strategy, i.e., joining the queue or balk, is investigated and the pricing policy is studied. Authors of [7] extend the work of [6] to an unobserved queue case and analyze the strategies of SUs and CBS. In [8] , the strategy of delaysensitive SUs is explicitly considered. The authors of [8] consider pricing and load balancing effects in the spectrum access decision-making in both monopoly and duopoly markets. The motivation of this work is to extend the previous works and overcome their limitations. It can be found that the previous works focused on the case that a separate CBS is used for serving the SUs. However, the installation and deployment of the CBS bring additional cost and it may not be practical in some cognitive systems. In contrast, we consider there is only one BS in the system. The primary job of the BS is to serve the incoming PUs, while it will utilize the time when the PU's frequency band is not occupied to serve SUs. Specially, when the PU comes, the BS no long holds the information of the queue and all the SUs are forced to leave the queue. When a SU decides to join the queue and wait for spectrum access opportunity, the sojourn time induces a cost and if its job has been finished, the SU can receive a reward. In addition, if PU emerges, the SUs who have to leave the queue without any reward or compensate. Under this model, we study the SU's decision-making process, i.e., whether to join for spectrum access or balk, and the pricing based spectrum access control.
The main contributions of this letter are as follows. We first model the interaction among SUs in a partially observed queue as a noncooperative game. Based on the queueing analysis and profit model, we then analyze both individually equilibrium strategy and optimal social equilibrium of the SUs about whether to join or not. Furthermore, we study the BS pricing strategy for the system such that the individually equilibrium decision of the SUs can coincide with the socially optimal strategy that optimizes the total welfare of the whole system. Our presented analysis and algorithm are demonstrated by the simulation studies.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Queue Model
We consider a CRN consists of multiple SUs, one BS and multiple PUs. When PUs are absent, the BS can utilize the available spectrum to serve the SUs. If the PU is entering the system, due to its priority, the BS has to drop the service connection of the SUs and starts to serve PU. Meanwhile, the queue consisting of the SUs is no long exists and all SUs should leave the queue and seek for other transmission opportunities. We consider the data arrival rate of the SU follows the Poisson process at rate λ and the arrival of the PU follows Poisson process at rate ξ . The service requirements of the SUs are i.i.d with exponential distribution μ. The First-Come-First-Served (FCFS) rule is applied for determining the service order of SUs at the BS. The length of the service time of the PU is also assumed to be exponentially distributed with rate η [6] , [7] .
The state of the system at time t is represented by a pair (N(t), I(t)), where N(t) is the length of queue, i.e., the number 1558-2558 © 2015 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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of SUs in the system. I(t) denotes the working status of the BS, with 1 standing for serving SUs and 0 showing that the BS is serving the PUs. So based on the system model, when I(t) = 0, we also have N(t) = 0.
B. Profit Model
We assume when being successfully served by the BS, the SU receives a reward s . We also assume that the cost of staying in the queue is CT where T is the sojourn time in the system representing the time that the SU stays in the queue and C is the unit cost. As for CRN, the SU needs to seek for transmission opportunities, so the balking cost is not explicitly considered [6] - [8] . Accordingly, we can have the definition of the expected individual profit [4] .
Definition 1: When there are n SUs in the queue, the expected individual profit of the arriving SU can be defined as
where θ s is the probability that SU can be served and E(Q n ) is the expected sojourn time related to n. Definition 2: The social profit of the considered system is given by [4] 
where ρ s is the fraction of SUs that join the queue and leave after being served, and E(N) is the mean number of SUs.
In the following, we consider the SUs are risk neutral, identical and try to maximize their profits. In addition, we also consider that when the SU enters the system at time t, all the system parameters including the profit model are known except the queue length N(t) and SU can only observe I(t) upon arrival, i.e., a partially observed queue is considered.
III. QUEUEING GAME FOR SPECTRUM ACCESS:
EQUILIBRIUM AND PRICING
A. Stationary Probability and Expected Sojourn Time
When the queue length is known to the incoming SUs, e.g., the case in [6] , the profit function will be according to the number of SUs in queue. Correspondingly, the strategy will be based on the number of SUs in the queue. In this work, the length of the queue is unobservable to the incoming SUs, thus, there are only two pure strategies, join and balk, and a mixed strategy is specified by the joining probability q ∈ [0, 1] of a SU that finds the BS is not serving PU. Therefore, the effective arrival rate is λ = λq. According to the considered queue model and transit rate (cf Fig. 2 in [10] ), we are able to obtain the stationary probabilities p(N(t), I(t)) according to the following balance equations,
Proposition 1: The stationary probability p(0, 0) and p(n, 1) can be given as follows,
where x(λ ) is
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A. In order to achieve the expected individual profit, from (1), θ s and E(Q n ) should be obtained at the first place. Consider a SU enters the network at state (n, 1) upon arrival and decides to join the queue. This SU may leave either due to service completion or due to a PU entering. For its service completion, the SU has to wait for a sum of n + 1 independent exponentially distributed times with parameter μ. For the case that the PU enters, the SU has to wait for an exponentially distributed time with parameter ξ . Hence, the sojourn time of the SU in the system is given as N = min(L n , Q), where L n follows a Gamma distribution with parameters n + 1 and μ. Q is an exponentially distributed random variable with rate ξ , and Q is independent of L n . Therefore, we have θ s = Pr(L n < Q). To this end, when considering N(t) and I(t) are known to the SU, we can obtain the θ s and E(Q n ) in (1) as
where n is the number of SUs in the queue. Then, we can use (3) and (9) to address U(n) in (1) and then find the expected individual profit of a SU that enters the queue with a certain probability.
B. Individually Equilibrium Strategy
With the results of the stationary probability and expected sojourn time, the expected individual profit of a SU that enters the queue with probabilityq can be achieved as following.
Proposition 2: When there is frequency bandwidth available for the SUs, the expected profit of a SU that enters the queue with probabilityq given that other SUs join the queue with probability q is given by
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B. We can now process to find out the individually equilibrium (IE) strategy of a SU and we have the following.
Theorem 1: In the considered model, a unique IE mixed strategy exists, with joining probability q e given by
The proof is given in Appendix C. From Theorem 1, we can observe that the IE is independent of the PU's service time. This is because the SU makes decision only when PU is not being served and the SU cannot be aware of the PU's information. However, the socially equilibrium strategies of the SUs do depend on the pricing strategies of the BS as well as the PU's arrival rate. The IE does not imply the social profit optimality. Thus, in the following, we investigate the social optimal strategy.
C. Social Optimization
Based on the definition of social profit, we can arrive at the following proposition.
Proposition 3: The expected social profit, given that the SUs follow a mixed strategy with probability q of joining (i.e., arriving SUs that find an BS not serving the PU enters with probability q, while the rest choose to balk without being served) is given by
Proof: To address the social profit (2), we need to find E(N) and ρ s . Using (3) and (9), we can obtain ρ s and E(N) as
Then, obtaining the geometric sums in (13) and through (2) we can arrive (12). With the observation in (12), we can observe the socially optimal strategy which can be found in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: In the considered model, a unique socially optimal strategy exists with probability q s of joining the queue which can be expressed as
where
The proof is similar to the one of Theorem 1, so we omit here due to space limitation. Details can be found in Appendix D in the longer version [10] .
D. Optimal Pricing
It can be observed that the socially optimal joining probability q s is always smaller than the individual one q e , which can also be found in Fig. 1 . To oblige the SUs to adopt the socially optimal strategy, one approach is to apply a pricing mechanism to reduce the individually optimal threshold q e [6] . In this work, we consider that the BS will act as an agent to impose an admission fee, which is a constant given the arrival rate, service pattern, reward and cost. The admission fee is to Fig. 1 . The equilibrium joining probability vs. reward. force the individually equilibrium probability to equal with the social optimal one.
When the admission fee is considered, the expected individual profit of a SU is given as U(n, p) = θ s ( s − CE(Q n ) − p). It can be observed that when imposing an admission fee, the social profit remains the same as it implies a transfer of income from one group to another. Thus, through (19), we can obtain (q s , q s , p). We further denote that the equilibrium probability of joining by q e (p). Then the optimal fee p * should satisfy q s = q e (p * ). As the monopoly market is considered here, and a monopoly does not allow the a positive user surplus since in such a case, the price can be increased without reducing q. Therefore, the p * can be arrived by
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
The numerical parameters are λ = 7, ξ = 0.5, μ = 3, η = 2, C = 2. First, in Fig. 1 , we can see that the socially optimal joining probability q s is always smaller than the individual one q e , and inherently, there is a gap between the individually equilibrium arrival rate and social arrival rate as the equilibrium arrival rate and social arrival rate can be given as λ e/s = λq e/s . Therefore, we can see that by imposing appropriate admission fee, the arrival rate of SUs can be regulated. In Fig. 2 , we can see that the social benefit when q s is used is higher than the one when q e is considered, which indicates that appropriate admission fee can improve the social benefits of the considered system.
V. CONCLUSION
In this letter, we have investigated the problem of spectrum access decision-making for the SUs in the CRNs. Utilizing the queueing game approaches, the decision-making process of the SUs that whether to queue or not is studied in present of arrival of the PUs. Both individual equilibrium and social optimization strategies are derived. Moreover, the optimal pricing of the service provider is also investigated. Our proposed algorithms and corresponding analysis are validated through simulation studies.
APPENDIX A
From (3)- (6), we can observe p(0, 0) = ξ η+ξ . To obtain p(n, 1), the similar approach used in [5, pp. 578 ] can be applied. One can notice that (5) can be considered as a homogeneous linear difference equation of order 2, which is with constant coefficients and characteristic equation
(16) have two roots, x (λ ) and x(λ ), which are
From the standard theory of homogeneous linear difference equations (see e.g. [9, Sec 2.3]), we conclude that
where c and c are constants. We can easily see that x > 1, thus, c should be necessarily 0. The constant c can be calculated using (6) and Proposition 1 can be approved.
APPENDIX B
When a SU decides to join given that the BS is serving SUs and others are following strategy q, the expected profit is 
U(n)
where p 1 (n, 1) = p(n,1)
is the probability that there are n SUs in the queue when a SU arrives. U(n) can be achieved through (9). As we have that (q, q) = (1 −q) (0, q) + q (1, q), (10) can be arrived and Proposition 2 can be proved.
APPENDIX C
For a SU, it will prefer to enter the queue if its expected individual profit after entering (1, q) > 0, and balk if it (1, q) < 0. Considering (1, q) = 0, we can solve for x(λ ) and the unique solution is x = 1 − C μ s . We notice that x(λ ), λ = λq is one root of (16). Then we are able to solve (16) with respect to q, which yields
We also observe that x(λ ) is a strictly increasing function for q ∈ [0, 1] as dx(λ ) dq > 0. Thus, q e ∈ (0, 1) iff x(λq e ) ∈ (0, κ), where κ = x(λ). In other word, q e is in the interval (0,1) iff (1−κ) . Moreover, it can be found that when s ≥ C μ(1−κ) , (1, q) keeps positive. Thus, the SU's best response is to join. In this case, "join" is the unique individual equilibrium. On the other hand, when s ≤ C μ , (1, q) becomes negative. In this case, "balk" is the individually equilibrium strategy. Therefore, Theorem 1 can be proved.
